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The In-common of Phenomenology: Performing KMA’s Congregation 
 
Eirini Nedelkopoulou 
 
This chapter approaches the relationship between the individual and the group by 
considering the experience of solitude in the context of the interactive public 
performance, Congregation by KMA. I start this discussion with the suggestion that 
performance concerns a spatial embodied reality of exposure between singularity and 
plurality. This reality resonates the phenomenological claim that “our individuality is 
inherently social in the way that it is experienced” (Ingram and Protevi 574). In the 
current context of “socially turned”1 performance that positions the participant in the 
place of the performer, it is worth foregrounding phenomenology’s approaches to 
social mechanisms in order to comprehend the dynamics of the audience’s 
performance.  
 
The chapter forms a phenomenological analysis of the modes of participation in 
Congregation through the perspective of Jean-Luc Nancy’s sociopolitical negotiation 
of “in-common.” Nancy’s “being-in-common” expresses “both the desire of the 
effectuation or formation of ‘community’ (as communion) through myth and the 
impossibility of any effective myth” (Morin 92). Therefore, on one hand, Nancy’s 
philosophical scope identifies with the Derridean skepticism towards institutional 
frameworks, and a rejection of common values and substance amongst the members 
of a community. On the other hand, Nancy’s thought demonstrates strong                                                         
1 Jen Harvie talks about “socially turned art and performance” in her Fair Play: Art, 
Performance and Neoliberalism (2013) reflecting on Claire Bishop’s commentary on the 
“social turn” in contemporary art (see Chapter 1 in Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the 
Politics of spectatorship [2012]). 
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phenomenological qualities and investigates structures that make the world possible. 
Drawing on this ambiguous dynamic of “being-in-common,” which enhances and 
contradicts phenomenology’s foregrounding of relationality, I explore the tension that 
defines contemporary understandings of social relations on the basis of interaction, 
exposure and difference. Congregation engages playfully with these tensions inviting 
a different understanding of participation as performance of solitude, that is, 
participation which is not performed alone.  
 
Congregation follows a decentred structure, which rethematizes the notion of 
community shifting from identity to difference, from proximity to isolation, and from 
disjunction to connection. Here participation is rethought not as a product or work of 
plurality but as a space of assemblage of solitaries, where participants are alone while 
together. The phenomenology of in-common in Congregation emerges as praxis of 
sense that defines audience’s engagement/disengagement, which lies in the limitation 
of their contact, of being-together and with others.  
     
KMA’s Congregation 
According to their website, KMA are a “collaboration between UK media artists Kit 
Monkman and Tom Wexler. Their work is primarily focused on illuminating, 
encouraging and developing interactions between people in public spaces using 
digitally-controlled projections.”2 KMA create projects for theatre, film and 
television. Congregation is an interactive kinetic light installation that takes place 
within a public space, a space that usually people go past on their way back from 
work, while walking their dogs, jogging, picking up their children from school.                                                          
2 http://www.kma.co.uk (Last accessed July 2014) 
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[INSERT FIGURE 10.1 HERE] 
Figure 10.1. Congregation, Rockbund Art Museum, Shanghai, 2010. Photo: Sun 
Zhongqin 
 
Congregation was designed for accidental pedestrian-performers: joggers, families, 
friends and strangers, which is to say, anyone who happened to go past the urban 
landmarks and city squares such as Square Market in Pittsburgh, Rockbund Art 
Museum in Shanghai, Bournemouth Square, Tate Britain in London, Tapseac Square 
in Macau, Bury Light Night. The setup of the installation is simple and 
straightforward: a 50-foot-wide screen and a light projection on a 25-minute loop of 
different shapes and patterns are projected within a circular space on the ground 
accompanied by Peter Broderick's musical score. A thermal camera up on the top of a 
125-foot crane picks up on the participants’ presence. Then the network that the 
camera is connected to generates a loop of light projections which spotlight, map, 
connect the participants to and separate them from each other.  
 
[INSERT 10.2 HERE] 
Figure 10.2. Congregation, Tapseac Square, Macau, 2012. Photo: Kit Monkman 
 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 10.3 HERE] 
Figure 10.3. Congregation, Market Square, Pittsburgh, 2014. Photo: Kit Monkman 
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The screen is a relay and offers a bird’s eye view of the space, turning the participants 
into digital blobs. Striking imagery of participants’ dispersal into a human-atom map 
is projected on the ground with light lines connecting and separating the individual 
circular areas and the participants within them. In the first half, participants are 
invited to explore an unfamiliar environment led by a projected human silhouette that 
appears on the ground at the centre of it all. The human outline draws attention and 
people position themselves in relation to this virtual presence. In the second half of 
the work, the human silhouette disappears and the focus shifts to the (literal and 
emotional) connections developed amongst the passers-by who become the project’s 
participants. The participants respond to the visual and kinetic technology with their 
presence, their impromptu choreographies and their encounters with a group of 
strangers into the open air. Even without any verbal or textual input, the audience 
picks up the structure of the artwork quickly. Although the audiences’ actions and 
reactions vary, there are several similar responses that can be observed almost every 
night.3 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 10.4 HERE] 
Figure 10.4. Congregation, Rockbund Art Museum, Shanghai, 2010. Photo: Tom 
Wexler  
 
For example, very often participants hold hands, creating the outline contour of the 
human figure; they observe the screen trying to track themselves down and wave at                                                         
3 The description of the project is based on my own experience of different shows of 
Congregation, discussions with Kit Monkman and Tom Wexler of KMA, online reviews, 
KMA’s website, documentation of different shows provided to me by KMA, documented TV 
and radio interviews with the artists, discussion with members of the audience. Some of the 
on-line sources can be found here: Market Square Public Art, 
http://www.marketsquarepublicart.com/2014/ (Last Accessed May 2014) 
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their virtual selves on the screen; they move playfully within the space activating 
different visual effects that generate organic patterns. Some participants take initiative 
and group together, set up simple tasks, organize their co-participants into different 
groups without necessarily talking, but by holding hands instead. At times, people 
stand still and alone within the boundaries of their circular projection. They do not 
hesitate to lie on the top of their projected silhouettes or the central human figure; 
they look up to the screen or down on the patterns and lights, to each other or just the 
lit sky of the urban landscape. And indeed there are times that they drift away to get 
back in to the circular space, or not. More often than not, the random unpredictable 
reactions, initiatives and behaviors of individuals, pairs or even groups disrupt and 
challenge their neighbor participants’ activity, as I describe later on in the chapter. 
 
Congregation and Participation 
Before I move to my analysis of Congregation as a space of “being-in-common,” I 
would like to provide a brief discussion of the project’s relevance to the current 
context of participatory, (or) social, (or) interactive art and performance. All these 
concepts could be used to describe Congregation. In the last decade or so, many 
pixels have lit up in the exploration of audience experience, “the hells and heavens”4 
of participatory performance. The political, economic and psychological framework 
of social relations have been extensively discussed, questioned and challenged. 5  The                                                         
4 I am appropriating Claire Bishop’s latest book title called Artificial Hells: Participatory Art 
and the Politics of Spectatorship (2012). 
5 For some of the recent works that address “the hells and heavens” of participation, see 
Adam Alston (2013, 2012), Claire Bishop (2004, 2006, 2012), Laura Cull & Karoline 
Gritzner (2011), Jen Harvie (2013), Shannon Jackson (2011), Susan Kattwinkel (2003), Jo 
Machon (2013), Nicholas Ridout (2013), Nicola Shaughnessy (2012), Gareth White (2013). 
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aesthetics and politics of participation have become a field of productive academic 
debate and incessant quest for artists, cultural organizations and funding bodies.  
 
The search for how the “we” performs, interacts and collaborates within a context 
which is more than “just art” characterizes an event-based culture that is keen to 
experience new conditions of togetherness, community and belonging. For Nicholas 
Bourriaud in Relational Aesthetics (2002), participatory art and performance love to 
think about the making and rising of communities, the sustainability of “models of 
sociability” and the production of human relations (70). Routinely, participatory and 
socially turned performance attempts to inspire positive social contacts that are 
defined by “neighborliness” and by “harmony and cohabitation” (Bourriaud 47, 53).  
Nevertheless, this view and practice has been strongly criticized for being naïve and 
unrealistic by critical thinkers, and for echoing in its “reversibility […] the 
commodified friendship of customer services” (Stewart Martin qtd. in Ridout 13).  
 
Congregation is part of this event-based culture, which primarily focuses on 
audiences’ interaction and experience in public spaces. KMA is keen to test and 
encourage new modes of participation between members of the public. Robert 
Klanten, Sven Ehmann and Verena Hanschke consider Congregation as a “social 
play” and suggest that it creates “a networked ‘digital playground’” where  
 [t]he resulting social engagements reaffirm the urban community through 
embodied, rather than verbal, discourse […] The participants are able to take 
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ownership of the work and the environment in which it is staged, creating a 
sense of occasion that informs and illuminates the public space (240). 
Indeed, Congregation could be identified as participatory or socially turned work in 
the sense that both concepts aim “to restore and realize a communal, collective space 
of shared social engagement” (Bishop, Artificial Hells 275). These types of practices 
actively engage “others who are not the artists (so principally, but not always, 
audiences)” and enhance “their social engagement” (Harvie 5). Unlike Congregation, 
the popular conceptualization of participatory performance and socially turned art 
rarely invites either “silent solitude” (Harvie 5) or “one to one relationship of 
‘interactivity’” (Bishop, Artificial Hells 1). KMA’s performance is undoubtedly 
structured as an interactive practice that “places the action of the recipient at the heart 
of its aesthetics” (Kwastek xvii), and yet it does provide the space and the time for 
one to feel at peace in one’s own company. 
 
At this point, drawing on Dan Graham’s opening citation of Bishop’s latest book, I 
would like to reflect on the “realness” of the audience’s experience within KMA’s 
interactive public frame. Graham claims that all artists “dream of doing something 
that’s more social, more collaborative, and more real than art” (in Bishop Artificial 
Hells 1). What is more real than human beings’ tendency to socially co-exist, 
collaborate or often isolate from their cohabitants, disrupt their peers’ efforts and even 
abandon the community to move on alone or with other cohabitants?  
 
So What is the In-common?  
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Nancy has discussed extensively the ontology of in-common “where being is in 
common, without ever being common” (“Of Being-in-common” 8, emphasis in 
original). In his Inoperative Community (1991) and Being Singular Plural (2000), 
amongst other works, Nancy rethinks community on the basis of being-in-common. In 
his “ontological and existential recasting” of community, Nancy refers to the latter as 
“a structure of a shared existence,” rather than “a specific social formation or mode of 
organization” (James 176). In a more recent publication co-authored with Laurens ten 
Kate, Nancy identifies being-in-common as a topological condition where I/other, 
disjunction/conjunction, singularity/plurality, aloneness/togetheness coexist (40). In-
common does not refer to mutual, similar or even equal qualities between people 
constituting an assemblage. It refers to a liminal space “between those 
communicating, between the I and its other, between you and me, and between us” 
(ibid.). The writers underline that “anything can happen, can take place in this strange 
place […] peace and violence, order and disorder, cohesion and destruction” (37). 
Hence, the concept of in-common offers a philosophical framework to think 
participation in Congregation without presupposing an idealistic structure in which 
participants coexist.  
 
Nancy’s formulation of being-in-common is indebted to the “withness” of being-in-
the-world in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927/1962) and particularly 
Heidegger’s concepts Mitdasein/Mitsein. Both thinkers relate being-in-common with 
a type of making (and in Nancy’s case breaking) of community. The difference 
between the two philosophers lies in their distinct approach to withness as being-in-
common (Nancy) and common being (Heidegger). Nancy’s thought regarding 
withness diverges from Heidegger’s slide back to subjectivity. Nancy’s major 
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objection lies in the belief that Heidegger’s later phenomenology “thinks access in 
terms of appropriation” (Morin 45). According to Nancy’s alternative approach to 
coexistence, community needs to maintain its “common.” Otherwise, it becomes a 
single thing (body, mind, fatherland, Leader…)” (Nancy, Inoperative Community 
xxxix). By losing its “common,” community becomes a “work” that participants need 
to produce, rather than experience. This is always the risk (and the trap) with 
participatory forms of social interaction. Community could be easily transformed into 
a project predicated on communal goals, eliminating difference and investing in the 
group’s “unicity and substanciality” (Nancy Inoperative Community xxxxix). 
 
In this respect, being-in-common has to deal with the strident and pressurized realities  
of participatory frameworks. These realities concern, according to Harvie, “models of 
social relation and community which either fetishize a myth of a unified singularity 
and thereby obliterate difference, or propose an unresolved multitude” (10). The 
longing for the creation of an original aesthetic community that can be sustained and 
regrouped and stay in contact after each event, apart from the obvious marketing and 
financial pressures linked to collective presence, echoes a purported premodern 
harmonious community. This is what Nancy would identify as a mythical picture that 
asks for a long-lost “familiarity, fraternity and conviviality” (Inoperative Community 
10). Inspired by Nancy, Bishop argues that these communities imagined by 
Bourriard’s relational aesthetics “require a unified subject as a prerequisite for 
community-as-togetherness” (“Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics” 79). These are 
“microtopian” communities of “immanent togetherness” (67). Nevertheless, 
participation cannot be based on the utopia of intimate and operative communities 
simply because these communities have never existed in order to be longed for. On 
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the contrary, community can only be possible on the basis of its “désœuvrement,”6 
“inoperativeness,” which is constitutive of its communication and of being-in-
common.  Community is “what happens to us” (Nancy, Inoperative Community 11). 
 
Congregation and In-common 
Commentators on Congregation have predictably focused on the group dynamics and 
the spatiality engendered by the piece. Klanten, Ehmann and Hanschke observe “a 
large assembled group of participants learns the piece together, acting as a 
coincidental community, attempting to comprehend their environment in a new way” 
(243). Tom Wexler emphasizes the spatiality of temporary solitude and togetherness 
of the experience when he argues that KMA’s work “causes people to stop for a 
moment, and to reconsider their place in that space, and also their relationship to other 
people in that space” (in Crawley).7 What is of particular interest in the above 
sentiments is Klanten’s remark on a sense of belonging and Wexler’s reference to a 
spatial experience of a collective, a congregation of singularities. Both claims refer to 
an open-ended spatiality that lies at the intersection of the communal, unfamiliar, 
personal and public space.  
 
This position needs to be considered in relation to the social as an ontological 
condition in which random passers-by find themselves in contact with each other.  In 
Congregation the space and “spacing” of the relational being of (being-) in-common,                                                         
6 Nancy borrowed this term (désoeuvré) from Maurice Blanchot to think community as a 
fragmented and interrupted entity.   
7 For CBS Pittsburgh, http://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2014/02/21/unique-traveling-light-show-
makes-pittsburgh-its-first-north-american-stop/ (Last accessed May 2014). 
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(being-) with-the-other(s) tests and challenges the social encounter within the public 
environment. This is not Bourriaud’s affirmative relational aesthetics, a “place that 
produces a specific sociability” and “tightens the space of relations” (Relational 
Aesthetics 16,15). In Congregation, the being-with is not “presupposed,” but only 
“exposed” through the participants’ lived experiences.8 KMA’s interactive project 
balances between disruption and coordination; neither does “dissensus” become the 
objective of the practice, nor audience coordination “rests too comfortably within an 
ideal of subjectivity as whole” (Bishop, “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics” 67).9 
In this instance, participants are not invited to form a mythical condition of 
“neighborliness” based on its members’ common qualities. And yet, Congregation 
does not stage the failure of community either. Rather, it allows participants to be in-
common. 
In Congregation, random pedestrians are invited into an open-air event that is not 
rehearsed or dependent on any verbal or textual input. In principle, there is no 
particular expectation of the performers apart from making an appearance, even if this 
is a brief crossing of the space. In-common is created through the planned and 
performed hindrances to community and communication. The performance operates 
as an interval to the local community by inviting them to engage in a particular task 
with strangers. Participants act upon the conventions and stimuli available, while their 
immediate contribution reveals and establishes their understanding to the open work.                                                         
8 I refer here to Nancy’s view that similar to community, being-in-common “cannot be 
presupposed. It is only exposed” (Inoperative Community xxxix). Alan Read, discussing the 
political in theatre, suggests that “[i]nverting the common velocity from individual to group, 
from self to collective, it is here the situation of ‘being in common’ that gives rise to the 
experience of being-self. It is only through such community that one is posed within an 
exterior, that one experiences an outside to one’s self and you, in Nancy’s provocative term, 
become exposed” (198). This negotiation between singularity and plurality as part of being-
in-common in performance participation is discussed later in the chapter. 
9 Jackson (2011) and Harvie (2013) expand on “social coordination” and “how art practices 
contribute to inter-dependent social imagining” (Social Works 14). 
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Their impromptu choreographies are almost always incomplete, even if some of them 
try desperately to complete a task, for instance, to circle the projected silhouette 
holding hands or to create a group heart shape.  
 
The nostalgic idea of creating a feel-good community is not completely eliminated in 
KMA’s piece. People still try to reach a specific goal or task by interacting with 
audiovisual stimuli and each other. However, the interactive structure of the 
installation, its public character, and the passers’-by (in)activity constantly interrupts 
this mythical ideal of community. Congregation introduces a stylized framework in 
public that disrupts the urban community. The community within the community is 
consecutively interrupted and offers a type of “inoperativeness,” which has no longer 
“to do with production or with completion” (Nancy, Inoperative Community 31). 
According to Nancy “incompletion” is an active process “of sharing,” a 
“communication of finitude” that is hardly ever completed (35). Although, 
interruption is not a type of participation that Congregation necessarily invites, the 
piece interjects idealistic and purposeful modes of participation. In the absence of 
interruption and separation, participants cannot expose themselves to each other, as 
they become assimilated into the group commonality. Therefore, there is no in-
common, no community. 
 
Monkman, the creative director, admits that KMA did not plan for the audience 
members to connect, engage or interact in a particular way (interview). The 
participants hardly ever speak to each other. They hold hands when they function in 
pairs or groups instead. I would argue that this form of contact is very much 
interlinked with a condition of in-common, being-with, not in a metaphorical or 
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idealist context, but a materialist one. Nancy proclaims that 
The ontology of being-with can only be “materialist,” in the sense that 
“matter” does not designate a substance or a subject […] The ontology 
of being-with is an ontology of bodies, of every body, whether they are 
inanimate, animate, sentient, speaking, thinking, having weight, and so 
on. Above all else, “body” really means what is outside, insofar as it is 
outside, next to, against, nearby, with a(n) (other) body, from body to 
body, in dis-position (Being Singular Plural 83-4).  
Being-in common as a social structure both exceeds and returns to its 
phenomenological dimension. According to Nancy, the “world invites us to no longer 
think of the level of the phenomenon, however it may be understood (as surging forth, 
appearing, becoming visible, brilliance, occurrence, event), but on the level […] of 
disposition (spacing, touching, contact, crossing)” (The Sense of the World 176). In 
similar terms, I focus on the “with” rather than on “being.”  
[INSERT FIGURE 10.5 HERE] 
Figure 10.5: Congregation, 2010, Tate Britain. Photo: Kit Monkman 
 
In Congregation, technology oscillates between visibility and invisibility. The sensor 
thermal mechanism that activates the event can be considered as a type of panoptic 
technology, responsible for appropriating and surveilling human experience. 
However, in this particular context the network system responds to the “with” of the 
in-common, of you and me and others and us. Technology is not the authority that 
changes and defines the audiences’ encounter with oneself or others; “with” is. Nancy 
discussing the “with” of being-with or being-in-common, writes: 
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we do nothing but appear together with one another, co-appearing 
before no other authority than this “with” itself, the meaning of which 
seems to us to instantly dissolve into insignificance, into exteriority, 
into the inorganic, empirical, and randomly contingent inconsistency 
of the pure and simple “with” (Being Singular Plural  63). 
The network system appears to simply indicate the potentiality of the participants’ 
withness to soon escape their attention and interest and “dissolve into insignificance.” 
What comes to the foreground is participants’ experience of being singular-plural.  
 
For the first part of the performance, soon after the music starts and the digital human 
contour appears, people start grouping together into a circular shape framing the 
human silhouette. Why are random strangers repeatedly drawn to hold hands as part 
of the different sections in Congregation? This is an opportunity to think about touch 
as a spontaneous reaction to the artistic frame set up by KMA, but also as an 
expression of a sense of “realness” and belonging. Touching can be risky and 
ambiguous in the sense that it opens one participant to another. This opening 
demonstrates the paradox of being incomplete, limited by the singularity of each 
human body, while also highlights each participant’s dependency on others. Nancy 
writes, “Touching one another with their mutual weights, bodies do not become 
undone, nor do they dissolve into other bodies, nor do they fuse with a spirit—this is 
what makes them, properly speaking, bodies” (The Birth to Presence 203). 
Congregation’s “exposers” consent to their performance and participation, to this in-
common convention that has an absolute limit in the contact of skin with skin. A 
sense of community and belonging emerges when strangers reach out their hands to 
touch their co-participants, whose bodies are “absolutely separated and shared” 
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(Nancy, The Birth to Presence 204). Touch marks this limit between separation and 
sharing where singularity and plurality co-exist.   
 
The experience of Congregation in Bournemouth offers an example of a clear 
celebration of togetherness in the name of community when a group of twenty-five 
participants – university students, elderly people, the homeless, and families amongst 
others hold hands. This disparate community, brought together by Congregation, in a 
euphoric and gregarious atmosphere make a circular shape with their bodies, some of 
them lung with one foot towards the middle and others lie on the ground. In this 
overtly affirmative experience, Monkman identifies a paradox: “the more they 
participate, the more they become a part of a collective body (and the more the 
collective body borrows from, and expands on, their participation). The more they 
become part of a collective body, the less significant their contributions become” 
(KMA blog).10 As Nancy would say in this occasion: 
The community that becomes a single thing [...] necessarily […] loses 
the with or the together that defines it. It yields its being-together to a 
being of togetherness (Inoperative Community xxxix). 
Hence, participants cannot maintain themselves within the intimacy of a group; any 
attempt to maintain this intimacy leads to appropriation of communication and 
propriety of a group. Binding all participants into an idealist basis of a hypothetical 
shared identity suppresses and ultimately sabotages community. In this case, the 
welcoming of a sense of belonging is confronted with the realization of the 
impossibility of the group insularity. 
 
                                                        
10 http://www.kma.co.uk/blog/ (last accessed May 2014) 
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There is a political quality to touching as an act of participation in the open air, 
amongst strangers and random pedestrians. While each singularity opens itself and 
remains open and incomplete expecting to receive from and share with the others, 
there are examples where participants were left out of a group, or refused to hold 
hands with strangers. In these cases, the opening and inclination toward11 others’ 
difference is restricted as it is filtered through what Rosalyn Diprose identifies as “the 
meanings that provide the horizon of my sense of belonging” (126). Touching as a 
mode of “co-appearing”12 brings to surface the sensitive balance between inclusion 
and exclusion; the artists try to obtain the former (inclusion) and avoid the latter 
(exclusion). Of course, one is nested into the other, as one’s inclusion will always 
result in somebody else’s exclusion. This happens because inclusion defines a border. 
Even if the group is welcoming, the definition of this individual group identifies a 
distinction that excludes those who are not part of the group. 
 
Indeed, feel-good moments follow through the imposition of social meanings, which 
inevitably include exceeding the limit of one’s body by touch. And these moments 
seem essential, as this touching and being-touched facilitate participation in 
interactive performance. So, while affirmative moments of acting together include 
assimilation of difference, they can also easily exclude difference either intentionally 
or inadvertently. For instance, a university student moves to the other side of the 
circle when a homeless man attempts to take her hand in the group’s circulation 
formation. This rapid reaction to his touch signifies the establishment and rejection of                                                         
11 Nancy talks about “clinamen […] an inclining from one toward the other, of one by the 
other, or from one to the other” (Inoperative Community 3). Inclination enables the opening 
and exposure of one to another. 
12 Drawing on Nancy’s discussion of “co-appearance” it could be proposed that touching 
hands signifies the participants’ “appearing to” themselves “and to one another, all at once” 
(Being Singular Plural 67).  
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otherness through the withdrawal from the limit of another’s touch. We can decide to 
find this proposition as an event of othering, and even vilification, when one is 
deprived of the ability to establish his uniqueness on the basis of his presupposed 
difference. According to Monkman, the life duration of similar moments of euphoric 
gatherings do not last longer than a few minutes, when a participant decides (or is 
made) to break from the group and devise one’s own solitary space of Congregation 
(Interview).  
 
In his recently published book Passionate Amateurs: Theatre, Communism and Love 
(2013), Nicholas Ridout reminds us of the necessity of distance “across which one 
encounters someone else that permits or even produces relations” in theatre audiences 
(148). There is an “apparent confusion between relation and unrelation,” which 
echoes the theatrical dimension in Nancy’s conception of “compearance” (Ridout 
147). “We” expresses there and then, how passers-by inhabit their space inside and 
outside Congregation by being exposed simultaneously to relationship and its lack 
thereof. It is useful to recall here Nancy when he presents us with the challenge to 
“disidentify ourselves from every sort of ‘we’ that would be the subject of its own 
representation, and we have to do this insofar as ‘we’ coappear” (Being Singular and 
Plural 71). The “we” of the participants and passers-by is that of their exposure to 
each other and the world they constitute. There is, as mentioned above, a temporal 
and spatial specificity to the “we.” Indeed, people that happen to cross a particular 
square or go past a specific venue during evening times comprise the performers of 
Congregation.  
 
 277  
The “realness” of the audience’s responses to Congregation, from their welcoming 
holding hands, to their irritability and finally to their withdrawal, constitutes “a 
relation without relation” (“Of-Nancy, Being-in-Common” 7). This is exactly the 
paradox of community: it cannot “control its in-common,” it cannot “control ‘itself’” 
(Nancy & ten Kate 39). Therefore, as soon as participants coappear to each other in 
the space, “there is community,” and participants are “inadvertently in common” 
(ibid. 37). Anything can happen. What audiences do not fully grasp is that the 
moment they try to control their in-common and engage in a particular type of 
operation or communal task, they stop being a community. That is, the idea of 
community (in an operative sense) fails them.  
  
Solitude/ Loneliness 
Congregation neither promises nor realizes community per se. While there are 
moments when participants find themselves working towards a common goal and 
sharing the same task, there is always the possibility of somebody dropping out, being 
forgotten by the group, not keeping up with the task. The question is: what happens to 
the participant who is momentarily excluded? Or to any potential participant whose 
limit has been exceeded to the extent that they are rejected from a temporary 
community for being foreign, strange and other? In this context, engagement between 
random pedestrians reveals a social and embodied vulnerability that is anchored to the 
sensitive negotiation between inclusion and exclusion.  
 
Surely the homeless participant rejected by the university student in the example 
given above is set apart from the particular encounter for being different and 
unfamiliar. And yet, whether or not he accepts this rejection and departs, his reaction 
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to the incident affects the unified presence of the circle, that is, his co-participants’ 
response to the structure of their performance as well as the thermal sensory system of 
the installation, and vice versa. A participant’s imposed withdrawal from a particular 
task (or Congregation overall) offers an opportunity to consider aloneness as a mode 
of participatory and social encounter.  In particular, a potential exclusion of a 
participant not only identifies the failure of a harmonious coexistence of a cohesive 
community, but also it raises a paradox. On one hand, exclusion strips a member from 
his or her exposure towards other participants. Aloneness occurs due to the 
interruption of inclination towards the other and puts the “excluded” member into a 
position of, as Diprose would identify it, “losing sense” (126). That is, the participant 
is left alone and momentarily (at least) deprived of the ability to signify his 
uniqueness within the context of the specific task. On the other hand, this exclusion 
causes the rearrangement of the circle and therefore the members’ contribution 
becomes more significant to the system that picks up different types of activity, other 
than the homogeneous movement of a collective presence. The myth of togetherness 
is interrupted, reinstigating its in-common condition. The above incident of exclusion, 
as much unfortunate and troubling it proves to be, also functions as a reminder of the 
impossibility of community as an operative totality, or a work of careful planning. 
Thus, community needs to be unworked (désoeuvré). Echoing Morin, “community is 
the experience of interruption of communion”and “this is the only possible 
community” (76). 
 
However, not all types of aloneness within social environments signify individuals’ 
forced withdrawal. Particularly in reference to the previous example, loneliness as a 
type of aloneness is often identified with a sense of (self)exclusion. According to 
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Stern, loneliness expresses “the pain of being alone” and “the understanding is that 
you are rejected by others and believe that, in some sense, you deserve to be rejected 
and therefore reject yourself” (38). Hannah Arendt draws a line between the 
experience of loneliness and solitude, proposing that “[l]oneliness comes about when 
I am alone without being able to split up into the two-in-one, without being able to 
keep myself company,” in contrast to solitude which “is that human situation in which 
I keep myself company”(185). Solitude, as often observed in different shows and 
projects of Congregation, is a form of aloneness that celebrates plurality by 
promoting engagement and attributing a creative, aesthetic and dialectical value to 
volitional withdrawal. 
 
Over its touring years KMA’s project has been exploring the tensions and exchange 
between “the individual and the collective, loneliness and togetherness” 
(Congregation Programme). At times the participants embody these tensions in very 
predicable ways, while at other times, their responses exceed the artists’ expectations. 
The human-atom-like map projected on the ground with light lines connects the 
participants to and separates them from the individual circular areas. Quite often 
participants break from their groups and pairs to playfully engage with their own 
game: either to occupy their digital imprint, observe the screen, or just be, stay still, 
lie or sit down. In doing so, they both establish and inhabit the performance space 
between a crowd and its singularities. 
[INSERT FIGURE 10.6 HERE] 
Figure 10.6: Congregation, 2010, Tate Britain. Photo: Kit Monkman 
Reflecting on the instances when participants as singularities break from the 
collective, responding to the experience of Congregation’s kinetic and interactive 
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network, solitude appears as a choice, not as a punishment or rejection. The 
participants stand alone and draw their attention to themselves, to their co-players 
from a distance, and to their immediate performance and urban environment. And yet 
they are in-common. Indeed, these simultaneous moments of intersubjectivity define 
the audience’s participatory activity.  
 
Hence, there is a need for participation to be kept in movement,13 in circulation to 
avoid formulating an operative together or product of careful planning. In 
Congregation, passers-by move in and out of the performance space. They flexibly 
break from their temporary groups and pairs, or they choose to never join them and 
delineate their own individual space. According to Monkman,  
it is the intuitive network which adjusts to the participants’ mobility. 
Congregation’s invisible technology and public character liberates audience 
from a sense of “responsibility” that they have to stay until the end of the 
show to applaud the labour of the live performers (interview).  
The pressure and responsibility of meeting the conventions of spectatorship is partly 
lifted, as participants stage their in-common performance.  
 
Solitude is a concept ignored in socially turned, community orientated art and 
performance due to a cultural fascination with active collective participation, and the 
hypothesis that solitude – similar to loneliness (but crucially, different) – appears as 
counter-cultural agent to sociability. Tillich offers an explanation to the above 
phenomenon in relation to quotidian experiences: 
                                                        13 By movement I mean here the being-towards others and the world. 
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today, more intensely than in preceding periods, man is so lonely that 
he cannot bear solitude. And he tries desperately to become a part of 
the crowd […] The same holds true of the forms of communal life, the 
school, college, office and factory. An unceasing pressure attempts to 
destroy even our desire for solitude (8). 
Yet, according to Sherry Turkle, solitude appears an imperative state that “refreshes 
and restores” (288).  This type of aloneness is experienced fully as part of our 
networked life only when we are “able to summon” ourselves by ourselves:14 
“Otherwise, [we] will only know how to be lonely” (ibid). The risk that contemporary 
(network) performance needs to take is to discover and devise new ways that allow 
audience members to enjoy their own company. 
 
In Congregation, solitude appears as a “retreat” and “subtraction” of this pressure to 
destroy our right to be alone; which is to say that solitude is a retreat and subtraction 
of the exteriority of collective participation, when the latter becomes a single thing. 
Nancy writes that “retreat opens, and continues to keep open, this strange being-the-
one-with-the-other, to which we are exposed” and “[c]ommunity is made of what 
retreats from it” (Inoperative Community xxxix). That is, togetherness and 
participation could both become problematic “either as the product of the working 
community, or else the community itself as work” (ibid). Retreat from “unicity” is 
necessary to prevent the diminution of the individual’s contribution to the 
performance without interrupting the exposure and the opening to otherness. 
                                                         
14 Solitude signifies the value of spending time with yourself; being able to keep yourself 
company by choice. The analysis of this embodied summoning of self by oneself is beyond the 
remit of this chapter.  
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Thomas Bernhard identifies a tension in the audience theatre experience, according to 
which “[e]ach person wants to participate and at the same time to be left alone” 
(Bernhard in Hoffman 11). While Bernhard underlines the impossibility of this 
tendency and the conflict that emerges from it, the in-common structure of 
Congregation seems to lie in the tension between aloneness and togetherness. 
Repeating Nancy’s terminology, the audience’s participation is also enabled from 
“what retreats from it” (Inoperative Community xxxix). The participant’s choice to act 
in solitude emerges from one’s response to animate and inanimate stimuli, other 
participants, the environment and the installation’s interactive system.  
 
KMA recognize the participatory context of Congregation in “the physical and 
empathic connections that separate us, and conjoin us” (Congregation Programme). 
One of the incidents at the opening night of Congregation in Bournemouth shows 
aspects of the tension (rather than conflict that Bernhard describes above) between 
solitude and togetherness. In an utterly euphoric atmosphere the group made a heart 
shape with their bodies when a couple said that they had been married the previous 
week (KMA Blog).15 The scene ended with a big round of applause. Reflecting on the 
specific incident of, no doubt, a well-intentioned gathering celebrating the collective, 
solitude (as withdrawal and disengagement from the euphoric group activity) was not 
absent. The giving of oneself during exposure to the other could reveal an ambivalent 
sense of aloneness between members of the audience, which is informed by 
constructive, uncertain, and even problematic communication. The heart-shaped 
arrangement of participants could be considered an amalgamation of all three. Certain 
participants joined the specific group, others remained observers to the participants’ 
                                                        
15 http://www.kma.co.uk/blog/ (Last accessed May 2014). 
 283  
makings and finally some were not interested and withdrew to look for different 
potential within the space.  
 
Withdrawal and solitude in Congregation when one drops out of the performance or 
marks one’s own separate space is very much interlinked with the participants’ sense 
of belonging. So somebody may say, echoing the Derridean denunciation of 
community, “I am not part of this group. Don’t count me in” (27), which also means 
that one wants to keep one’s freedom and choose one’s own way of engaging with an 
activity, group and performance. Hence, the encounters between one and others are 
interrupted and often recuperated – strengthening the condition of in-common even 
through the choice of disengagement. We can decide to find solitude as a mode of 
participation that prevents audience members not only from losing themselves in the 
crowd but also from losing the others as well.16 Solitude declares the participants’ 
need for protection from what is expected that they offer back to the group, but also 
the need to engage with the performance alone or from a distance. For this reason, this 
type of withdrawal in Congregation does not take the form of loneliness - and I would 
identify loneliness with exclusion here. Rather, solitude defines a creative space that 
is part of the in-common of participants’ openness and coexistence.  
 
Conclusion  
In Congregation, in-common is a topological encounter where a heterogeneous 
assemblage co-exists in “the noise”17 of an initially non-shared space.  These random                                                         
16 Here I reflect on Derrida’s sentiments against the “organic totality” imposed by the 
mechanisms of a community, family, a group etc. as described in his essay “I Have a Taste 
for the Secret” (27). 
17 The noise of people who have nothing in common, as Alphonso Lingis writes in his book 
The Community of Those who Have Nothing in Common (1994 12,73,80,97,105). Lingis’ 
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pedestrians have, at first, no shared purpose. Yet their encounter is essential to the 
communication and making of an interactive participatory practice that attempts to 
test the grounds of social engagement within the public sphere, without forcing 
specific responsibilities, fees or behavioral patterns to the audience. Of course, there 
are playful patterns, which audiences can choose to follow or not. Although KMA 
hardly ever mention the concept of community to describe the company’s interactive 
and participatory practice, their project “eagerly promotes inclusion and attempts to 
work creatively with exclusion” (Congregation Programme). 
 
Philosophers and theorists often address with skepticism the good and benevolent 
intentions of community. In the face of historical and political distrust of the concept, 
as well as the commodification of artistic products, at a time when human 
singularities as part of the collective are reduced to numbers, there is a big question: 
Why do we still care enough to talk about and theorize community, to devise work 
based on the challenging condition of community? Derrida offers a suggestion here 
when he argues that “[t]he desire to belong to any community whatsoever, the desire 
for belonging tout court, implies that one does not belong” (“I Have a Taste for the 
Secret” 28).  
 
As much we are convinced by the troubling context and exclusive character of 
community, there is a need to think of belonging or to “re-invent the stage” of 
participation, especially within a creative milieu. As Nancy would argue here, this is 
                                                                                                                                                              
view seems to echo Nancy’s sentiment regarding limitation in communication, which obtains 
being-in-common in our everyday experience. Nancy argues: “I no longer hear in it what the 
other wants to say to me, but I hear that the other speaks and that there is an essential archi-
articulation of voices which constitutes the being-in-common” (Inoperative Community 76). 
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not about “innovation”: we need to reinvent the staging of our co-appearance “each 
time, each time making our entrance anew” (Being Singular Plural 70-1). This is not 
to suggest that performance and art destabilize and challenge the pressures of cultural 
production by accommodating this stage. But I do find Congregation amongst other 
public, social and participatory artworks offers convincing and partial responses to 
these pressures. I willingly observe modes of solitude and social effective encounters 
within this interactive practice.  If we can talk about a coincidental condition of in-
common in Congregation, it is important to see community not simply as the product 
of the random participants’ encounter; it is not just the sum of individuals having 
something in common. Rather, community in this interactive work is and could only 
be possible as a “désoeuvre,” “inoperative” congregation of singularities. 
 
The phenomenological discussion of the interactive public performance of 
Congregation reflects on the current infatuation with making more collaborative, 
more social, more inclusive performances. In response to economic, social and 
cultural tensions, which in many ways are impossible to avoid, the intermissive 
structure of in-common offers a theoretical and material format that “reinvents the 
stage” of our human contact through displacement, solitude and retreat. Congregation 
stages a place where participants are in-common, “only to discover that this ‘in-
common’ cannot always be controlled by them and so eludes them” (Nancy and ten 
Kate 37). Nevertheless, this in-common condition, which sits in the bind between our 
connection to, and perception of, familiarity and difference, could still allow a sense 
of belonging to thrive, at least every now and then.  
 
Acknowledgements 
 286  
I am very grateful to Kit Monkman (KMA) for his generosity and the provision of 
documented published and unpublished material for Congregation. I would like to 
thank my co-editors, Maaike and Jon, for their support, encouragement and 
constructive feedback. Finally, I would like to thank Jenny Hall and the Yorkshire 
Innovation Fund who enabled my discussions with KMA. 
 
Works Cited 
 
Alston, Adam. “Audience Participation and Neoliberal Value: Risk, Agency and 
Responsibility in Immersive Theatre.” On Value Edition. Performance 
Research, 18.2 (2013) 128-138. 
Alston, Adam. “Damocles and the Plucked: Audience Participation and Risk in Half 
Cut.” Contemporary Theatre Review, 22.3 (2012), 344-354. 
Arendt, Hannah. The Life of Mind, Willing/Thinking, San Diego: Harcourt. 1978. 
Bishop, Claire. “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics.” OCTOBER 110, October 
Fall (2004), Ltd. and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 51–79. 
--- (ed.). Participation. London: Whitechapel Gallery, 2006. 
---. Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship. London, New 
York: Verso, 2012. 
Bourriaud, Nicolas. Relational Aesthetics. 1998. Trans. Pleasance, Simon and Fronza 
Woods with Mathieu Copelands Dijon: Les presses du réel, 2002. 
 287  
Crawley, Dave “Unique Traveling Light Show Makes Pittsburgh Its First North 
American Stop” interview for CBS Pittsburgh, February 21, 2014. Available at: 
http://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2014/02/21/unique-traveling-light-show-makes-
pittsburgh-its-first-north-american-stop/ (last accessed May 2014) 
Cull, Laura & Gritzner, Karoline. “On Philosophy &Participation.” Performance 
Research. December (2011)16.4. Taylor & Francis. 
Derrida, Jacques . “I Have a Taste for the Secret” in and A Taste for the Secret. Eds. 
Derrida, Jacques and Maurizio Ferraris. Trans. Giacomo Donis. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2001. 
Diprose, Rosalyn. “The Body Intermediating Community' in Intermedialities: 
Philosophy, Art, Politics. Eds. by Oosterling, Henk and Ewa Plonowska Ziarek. 
Lanham MA: Lexington Books, Rowman & Littlefield, 2011, 119-126. 
Harvey, Jen. Fair Play: Art, Performance and Neoliberalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2013.  
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. 1927. Trans. Macquarrie, John and Edward 
Robinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962. 
Hoffman, Kurt. Aus Gespauchen mit Thomas Bernhard. Munchen: Deutsche 
Verlagsanstalt, 1991. 
Ingram, David B. and Protevi, John. “Political Philosophy” in Columbia Companion 
to Twentieth-Century Philosophies. Ed. Boundas, Constantin V. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 570-588. 
 288  
Interview with Kit Monkman, conducted by Eirini Nedelkopoulou, February 2014, 
York. 
Jackson, Shannon. Social Works: Performing Art, Supporting Publics. New York; 
London: Routledge, 2011. 
James, Ian. The Fragmentary Demand: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc 
Nancy. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006. 
Kattwinkel, Susan (ed.). Audience Participation: Essays on Inclusion in Performance. 
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003. 
Klanten, Robert, Sven Ehmann, Verena Hanschke (eds). A Touch of Code: Interactive 
Installations and Experiences. Berlin: Gestalten, 2011. 
KMA blog, http://www.kma.co.uk/blog/ (last accessed May 2014) 
KMA, Congregation Programme. Pittsburg January 2014. 
KMA website, http://www.kma.co.uk  (last accessed May 2014) 
Kwastek, Katja. Aesthetics of Internaction in Digital Art. Cambridge; MA: The MIT 
Press, 2013. 
Lingis, Alphonso. The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. 
Machon, Joshephine. Immersive Theatres: Intimacy and Immediacy in Contemporary 
Performance. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013. 
Market Square Public Art, http://www.marketsquarepublicart.com/2014/ (Last 
Accessed May 2014) 
 289  
Morin, Marie-Eve. Jean-Luc Nancy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012. 
Nancy, Jean Luc. The Birth to Presence. Trans. Brian Holmes. Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1993. 
---. “Of Being-in-Common” in Community at Loose Ends. Ed. Miami Theory 
Collective. Trans. James Creech. Oxford, Ohio: Minnesota University Press, 
1991, 1-12. 
---. Being Singular Plural.  Trans. Anne E. O’Byrne and Robert D. Richardson. 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000.  
---. The Inoperative Community.  Ed. Connor, Peter. Trans. Peter Connor et al. 
Foreword by Christopher. Fynsk. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1991. 
---. The Sense of the World.  Trans. Librett, Jeffrey S. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997. 
Nancy, Jean Luc, ten Kate, Laurens. “ ‘Cum’….Revisited: Preliminaries to Thinking 
the Interval” in Intermedialities: Philosophy, Art, Politics. Eds. by Oosterling, 
Henk and Ewa Plonowska Ziarek. Lanham MA: Lexington Books, Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2011, 37- 44. 
Read, Alan. Theatre, Intimacy and Engagement: The Last Human Venue. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009. 
Ridout, Nicholas. Passionate Amateurs: Theatre, Communism, and Love. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2013.  
Shaughnessy, Nicola. Applying Performance: Live Art, Socially Engaged Theatre and  
 290  
Affective Practice. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012. 
Stern, Julian. Loneliness and Solitude in Education: How to Value Individuality and 
Create an Enstatic School. Oxford; New York: Peter Lang, 2014. 
Tillich, Paul. The Eternal Now. London: SCM, 2002. 
Turkle, Sherry. Alone/Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less 
from Each Other. New York: Basic Books, 2011. 
White, Gareth. Audience Participation in Theatre: Aesthetics of the Invitation. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013.  
 
 
 
